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Op-F..d

The anti-immigrant game
Laws such as Arizona's SB 1070 are not natural responses to undue hardship but are products ofpartisan politics.
April 24, 2012

I By Pratheepan Gulasekaram and Kart hick Raniakrishnan

The Supreme Court hears oral arguments Wednesday on the constitutionality of .Arizona's 2010 im1nigration enforcement lav>'. If upheld,
SB 1070 Vl'ould require local police in 1nost circumstances to deterinine the immigration status of anyone they stop based only on a
reasonable suspicion that the person is unla\vfully in this country. It ¥:ould also compel residents to carry their immigration papers at all
times and create state itnmigration critnes distinct fro1n what is covered by federal la\\', Afe,v other states, such as Alaban1a and Georgia,
and some cities have passed similar la,vs, and 1nany n1ore 1nay consider such Jaw"S if the Supreme Court finds Arizona's law to be
constitutional.
The priinaiy legal debate in U.S. vs. Arizona \viii focus on the issue of whether a state government can engage in immigration enforcement
\vithout the explicit consent of the federal government. The state of Arizona \\ill argue that its measure simply complen1ents federal
enforcement, \\'hile the federal gove111ment 'vill argue that Arizona's la'v undennines national authority and that immigration enforcement
is an exclusively federal responsibility.
Missing from this important legal debate, ho\\'ever, is the larger question of \\ hy states and localities are getting involved in in1migration
enforcement in the first place. The conventional v.isdo1n on these policies is that federal inaction, combined \vith den1ographic pressures
fro1n itnmigration, have left these states and cities little choice but to act. According to this logic, ne\v immigrants, especially illegal
hn1nigrants, are causing cultural and economic upheavals in places unaccustomed to such transformations. Consequently, la\\'S like
Arizona's SB 1070 and Alabama's HB 56 are seen as natural and ine,itable responses.
1

These reasons, hO\\'ever, do not stand up to e1nphical investigation. In our ne\v systematic study of these state and local immigration lav.•s,
the data sho\v that comn1only assumed factors - e.g., the gro\vth of immigrant populations, immigrant-caused economic stress, prevalence
of Spanish speakers and overcrov.·ded housing - 1nake no significant difference in the proposal or passage of these restrictive in1n1igration
laws.
By contrast, political partisanship consistently predicts \Vhen and \vhere states and localities 'vill introduce restrictive in1migration la\vs,
with Republican-heavy areas especial1y likely to do so. For instance, restrictive ordinances are 93% more likely to pass in Republican
counties than in Democratic ones. At the state level, there is a 47% difference bet\\'een Republican-heavy states and De1nocrat-heavy states.
Restrictionist and anti-illegal immigrant activist groups, such as Numbers USA, the Federation for An1erican I1nmigration Reform and
rising stars in the Republican Party, such as Kansas Secretary of State Kris Kobach, choose venues for iln1nigration enforce1nent schemes
that are politically receptive to im1nigration restriction. These places - like Valley Park, Mo., and the state of Alaba1na - are not
necessarily areas that have experienced the greatest increases in in1migration or immigrant-induced social and economic problems.
Ho\vever, these jurisdictions are mostly Republican, \Vhere syinpathetic elected officials can fast-track restrictive bills and v.'here pri1nary
voters can be counted on to push for legislative action on im1nigration.
Undoubtedly, Arizona is hea\ily Republican and has experienced great increases in inunigration. Ho,vever, other border states \vith even
greater increases in their illegal im1nigrant populations, such as Ne\v Mexico and Texas, have not passed similar la\\'S. Furthermore, our
larger systen1atic analysis of 25,000 municipalities and all 50 states found that partisanship-based explanations more accurately account
for these laws, includingArizona1s.
Mean\vhile, states and localities \\ith much higher proportions and populations of legal and illegal inunigrants have either taken no action
on immigration or have passed la,vs helping to integrate and acco1n1nodate their hn1nigrant populations. For exan1ple, California and
Illinois allo\\' students here unla\vfully to pay in-state tuition at public universities, and have barred the state, its counties and its cities
from requiring employers to participate in E-Verify, an electronic federal employment verification system.
V\lhy are our findings consequential for \\'hat is happening in Arizona and else\\•here? Our political model sho\vs these la\vs should not be
understood as natural and inevitable responses to the ne'v geography of itnmigration. These state and local lav.'S do not arise out of
econo1nic or social necessity.
Instead, they are mostly, if not ahvays, pre-designed "solutions" in search ofin1migration "proble1ns." Indeed, the same individualKansas' Kobach - has helped design some of the bills, \\'hi ch \\'ere presented as model legislation to places \Vhere they \\'ere likely to be
passed. These have proved appealing in states such as Alabama and Mississippi, v.'hich have relatively lo\v iminigrant populations and
\Vhere immigration does not pose a significant public policy problem.
Consistent \\1th the trial and appellate court decisions in the case, the Supreme Court will likely also rule that federal la\\' preempts SB
1070, But such an outcome \vould not mean the end of state and local atte1npts to participate in immigration enforcement. Future public
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and judicial evaluations of these lav-:s should recognize them for \\'hat they are: political gamesn1anship and not rational or useful public
policy.

Pratheepan Gulasekaran1 is an assistant professor of law at Santa Clara Uniuersity and Karthick Rarnakrishnan is associate professor
ofpolitical science at UC Riverside. They are con1pleting a book on the rise of state and local imn1igration laws in the United States.
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